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CoNSTITUTIONAL LAw-CoMMBRCE CLAUSE-STATE STATUTE REQUIRING
lNTERsTATE MoroR CARRIER TO SECURE A PERMIT-Petitioner brought an
action in an Arkansas state court to enjoin enforcement of a state statute which
required all contract carriers using the highways of the state to secure a permit
from the state Public Service Commission.1 The Arkansas Supreme Court
found that five driver-owners who had been arrested while transporting petitioner's product in interstate commerce without such a permit were "contract
carriers" within the meaning of the statute. Neither petitioner nor any of the
drivers had applied for a state permit. Under the terms of the statute, granting
of the permit was contingent on certain factors, such as the financial reliability
of the applicant, applicant's sense of responsibility to the public, and the existing
and proposed transportation service.2 • Held,. four justices dissenting, the requirement of such a permit imposes no undue burden on interstate commence because
there was no showing that the state will ever attempt to impose any of the
apprehended burdensome conditions as prerequisite to the granting of the

16 Ark Stat. (1947) §73-1701 et seq., known as Arkansas Motor Carrier Act, 1941.
2Jd., §73-1712.
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permit. Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Co. -v. Wood, 344 U.S. 157, 73 S.Ct. 204
(1952).
It has been quite uniformly recognized since Gibbons -v. Ogden8 in 1824
that the grant of power to Congress under the commerce clause4 necessarily
implies some degree of limitation on a state's power to regulate interstate
commerce.5 The most widely accepted view has been that a state retains the
power to regulate commerce as to local matters not requiring uniform national
legislation until Congress acts to displace this power. 6 The problem of the
principal case, the constitutionality of a state statute which requires an interstate motor carrier to obtain a permit as a condition precedent to use of the
highways of the state, was first considered by the Supreme Court in Buck -v.
Kuykendall. 7 In that case the Court held that a state could not refuse a permit
to an interstate motor carrier on the ground that existing transportation facilities
were adequate, since this constituted an obstruction of interstate commerce
and contravened the implied prohibition of the commerce clause.8 Subsequent
cases, however, have established some important distinctions. A state may
validly impose safety, health or conservation regulations on carriers, even though
they are engaged exclusively in interstate commerce, these being deemed
essentially "local" problems under the prevailing view. 9 Thus, a state may
deny an interstate motor carrier permission to use a specific highway on the
basis of traffic congestion;10 it may impose reasonable size and weight limitations
on interstate carriers as a conservation measure;11 it may revoke an interstate
s 9 Wheat. (22 U.S.) 1 (1824).
4 U.S. CoNsT., art. I, §8: "The Congress shall have Power ••• To regulate Commerce
with foreign Nations, and among the several States. • ••"
5 In Gibbons v. Ogden, note 3 supra, Chief Justice Marshall asserted that the power
of Congress over interstate commerce was exclusive, subject only to police power regulation
by the states.
6 This approach was first advanced in Cooley v. Port Wardens of Philadelphia, 12
How. (53 U.S.) 299 (1851). This test was followed by Stone, C.J., in Southern Pacific
Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 65 S.Ct. 1515 (1945). See also Panhandle Eastern Pipe
Line Co. v. Michigan Public Service Commission, 341 U.S. 329, 71 S.Ct. 777 (1951).
The enactment of the Federal Motor Carrier Act of 1935 displaced certain powers of the
states to regulate interstate motor carriers, e.g., to prescribe maximum hours of service and
qualifications of drivers. See 49 Stat. L. 546 (1935), 49 U.S.C. (1946) §304. Current
regulations may be found in 49 C.F.R. §191.1 et seq. (1949). On displacement, see
comment, 60 HAnv. L. Rsv. 262 (1946). The interstate contract carriers involved in the
principal case are required to secure a permit from the Interstate Commerce Commission
under this act. 49 U.S.C. (1946) §309.
7 267 U.S. 307, 45 S.Ct. 324 (1925).
Blbid. Bush Co. v. Malloy, 267 U.S. 317, 45 S.Ct. 326 (1925), decided the same
day, also held that a state could not refuse a permit to an interstate carrier on the basis
that existing transportation facilities were adequate.
9 For a thorough treatment of this subject and a collection of the earlier cases, see
Kauper, "State Regulation of Interstate Motor Carriers," 31 MrcH. L. R.Ev. 920, 1097
(1933).
10 Bradley v. Public Utilities Commission of Ohio, 289 U.S. 92, 53 S.Ct. 577 (1933).
11 South Carolina State Highway Dept. v. Barnwell Brothers, 303 U.S. 177, 58 S.Ct.
510 (1938). See also Maurer v. Hamilton, 309 U.S. 598, 60 S.Ct. 726 (1940) which
held valid a state statute that prohibited operations of vehicles carrying another vehicle
above the cab or over the head of the operator on state highways. See comment on size and
weight limitations, 36 MrcH. L. Rsv. 443 (1938).
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carrier's permit when the carrier has disobeyed a state law prohibiting the
transaction of intrastate business on an interstate permit;12 or it may validly
prohibit interstate shipments of liquor by carriers other than those authorized
by the state.13 Recent decisions have indicated that the Court will go far in
upholding local regulations which require a permit or license when it can :6.nd
that the activity is essentially "local" in aspect, even though the result is to
regulate interstate commerce.14
In the principal case, both the majority and the dissenters seemed to overlook the true import of Clark v. Poor15 decided only two years after Buck v.
Kuykendall. 16 In the Clark case, the Ohio statute requiring the motor carrier
to obtain a permit was similar to the Arkansas statute in the principal case,
and provided that the permit could be refused when existing transportation
facilities were adequate.17 As in the principal case, an injunction was sought
but refused by the Supreme Court because the carrier had not been refused a
permit-the carrier had made no application for one-and because state officials
had expressly disclaimed any right to refuse a permit to any carrier engaged in
interstate commerce.18 In these respects, the principal case would seem to be
substantially on all fours with Clark v. Poor. It is submitted that the result
is sound in both of the cases, but that the Court in each case failed to give
its real reason for refusing the injunction. It would seem that what the Court
was really doing was employing its well-known judicial technique of avoiding
the constitutional issue whenever possible.19 In neither case had the state
refused the interstate carrier a permit on the grounds outlawed by Buck v.
Kuykendall, 20 and it is not at all certain that the state courts would have allowed
such a refusal, since both acts contained provis!ons that the statute should not
be construed so as to conllict with the federal power to regulate interstate
commerce.21 It is suggested that the Court should have refused to anticipate
the question of constitutional law and refrained from determining the validity
12 Eichholz v. Public Service Commission of Missouri, 306 U.S. 268, 59 S.Ct. 532
(1939).
13 Ziffrin, Inc. v. Reeves, 308 U.S. 132, 60 S.Ct. 163 (1939). See also Duckworth
v. Arkansas, 314 U.S. 390, 62 S.Ct. 311 (1941), holding valid a state statute requiring all
transporters of liquor through the state to secure a permit for identification purposes.
14 Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co. v. Michigan Public Service Commission, note 6
supra; Buck v. California, 343 U.S. 99, 72 S.Ct. 502 (1952). Cf. California v. Zook, 336
U.S. 725, 69 S.Ct. 841 (1949).
15 274 U.S. 554, 47 S.Ct. 702 (1927).
16 In both Buck v. Kuykendall and Clark v. Poor, the majority opinion was written
by Brandeis, J.
17 Ohio Gen. Code (Throckmorton, 1926) §614-87. This same statute is now found
in Ohio Rev. Code (Baldwin, 1953) §4921.10.
18 Clark v. Poor, note 15 supra. Accord: Columbia Terminals Co. v. Lambert, (D.C.
D.C. 1939) 30 F. Supp. 28, app. dismissed and holding essentially affd. 309 U.S. 620, 60
S.Ct. 471 (1940).
10 For a good example of this approach, see Spector Motor Service, Inc. v. McLaughlin,
323 U.S. 101, 65 S.Ct. 152 (1944).
20 I.e., that the area the carrier proposed to serve already had adequate transportation
facilities.
216 Ark. Stat. (1947) §73-1726; Ohio Gen. Code (Page, 1946) §614-101 [omitted
from Ohio Rev. Code (Baldwin, 1953)].
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of the state statute until applied and interpreted by the state,22 or that the
Court should have granted the injunction restraining the state commission
from imposing any of the alleged burdensome conditions as applied to carriers
engaged in interstate commerce.
Marvin 0. Young, S.Ed.

22 ''The mere susceptibility of a statute to a construction which could render it unconstitutional does not afford sufficient ground for injunctive relief where, as here, it does
not appear that the Statute has ever been so construed, where the enforcing authorities
affirm a recognition of its unconstitutionality if so construed and disclaim any intention to
do so.•••" Columbia Terminals Co. v. Lambert, (D.C. Mo. 1939) 30 F. Supp. 28 at 32.

